



Rudolf Andorka in his traditional, historicising Hungarian gala dress, which he wore as a diplomat in Spain (1930's).

Júlia Andorka's private collection

===== András Joó =====

/// What Stalin's Death Did Not Really Change:

A Tell-tale File of Hungary's Pre-World War Two Intelligence Chief

Rudolf Andorka, the famous sociologist, was fulfilling his military service in March 1953. Meanwhile, his father who, on the eve of the Second World War had served as head of Hungarian intelligence and counterintelligence, had been a resident of the Kistarcsa internment camp for years and held there without a trial. The son, who later became a distinguished social scientist, recalled how the news of the Soviet dictator's death was received: "When we heard that Stalin had died, in our euphoria we engaged in a huge, happy bout of wrestling in a secluded room where the officers' corps was not likely to be present. We celebrated Stalin's death with several hours of joyful scuffles."¹

Andorka, Jr. was perhaps hopeful at the time that better times would come and that his father's persecution and imprisonment would end. This proved to be a vain hope, although the years that followed did ultimately bring some relief. In the wake of Stalin's death, much was undoubtedly about to change, at least in the sense that the methods changed. For example, in the field of intelligence, pragmatic factors began to prevail more than mere intimidation and harsh, repressive action.

Experienced senior officers of the pre-1945 General Staff who had once been involved in the intelligence and counterintelligence work of the Second Department of the Chief of the General Staff (*Vezérkari Főnökség 2. osztálya, or 2. vkf. osztály*, now widely referred to by its not entirely accurately formed abbreviation, VKF-2) could not avoid the constant monitoring of the Hungarian state security services. Quite a few of them left the country in 1945, while others stayed, and still others were only able to return home (with great luck) after a long period of Soviet captivity. It is more than obvious that for those who were imprisoned in the Soviet Union,

1 = = VERITAS OHA, "Interview with Rudolf Andorka," 57.

Stalin's death could truly be called the greatest blessing, as they were finally able to return home within a year or two thereafter. At the same time, and even with the arrival in 1953 of Imre Nagy, the newly appointed and reformist prime minister, for many former officers at home significant changes would only come later. Of course, state security had also intended, in addition to other objectives such as simple intimidation, to explore the workings and former networks of the previous intelligence organisations, both at home and abroad.²

= = Memoirs and Profiles for State Security: The Nature of General Andorka's File

The extensive organisational expertise and contacts of former intelligence and counter-intelligence professionals were of increasing interest to communist state security officials.³ As a result, it was fairly common that former VKF-2 officers were ordered to prepare studies of varying lengths and even full recollections.⁴ In the late 1970s, the memoirs of Colonel Gyula Kádár, who had headed the Hungarian "Deuxième Bureau" starting in 1943, were published in a form that fitted the aims of the cultural policy of the time, which was associated with György Aczél, the leading cultural politician of János Kádár's regime. The memoirs of the Colonel could only appear in print with frequent and unmarked modifications, or even omissions and truncations of the original. The manuscript of the reminiscences (whose publication at the time caused a veritable sensation) was prepared much earlier on the "instruction" of state security.⁵

It was not uncommon for state security officials to require the former members of VKF-2 to write shorter personal profiles of important military officers, diplomats, and various agents who had previously been employed in their service abroad. Thus, state security officials hoped to filter out what might prove useful for them in their future operations. However, relatively few of this type of document survived in the end. Retired Major General Rudolf Andorka was also expected to prepare such character profiles at suitable times. He, as mentioned, was a prominent

2 = = Sándor Szakály, "Az önálló magyar katonai hírszerzés és kémelhárítás létrehozása és működése a két világháború közötti Magyarországon 1918–1945," *Felderítő Szemle* 7, (2008): 36–37.

3 = = See the following introductory study to the most relevant source edition concerning our topic: György Haraszti, "Vallomások a túlélésért. Az Ujszászy-feljegyzések keletkezéstörténete," in *Vallomások a holtak házából. Ujszászy István vezérőrnagynak, a 2. vkf. osztály és az Államvédelmi Központ vezetőjének az ÁVH fogságában írott feljegyzései* (Budapest: Corvina – Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára, 2007), 9–37.

4 = = ÁBTL I. 4.1. A-863, Study on VKF-2, undated; ÁBTL I. 3.2.1. Bt–262/1. Career report of Otto Hatz (Hátszeghi Ottó) Annex No. 4, October 20, 1955.

5 = = Gyula Kádár, *A Ludovikától Sopronkőhidáig* (Budapest: Magvető, 1978), vol. I–II. Compare: ÁBTL I. 4.1. A–862. Gyula Kádár's reminiscences.

military officer and for years oversaw Hungarian military intelligence and counter-intelligence. His “reports” from the year 1954 have been preserved in a so-called “research file” marked “κ” (referring to the Hungarian word *kutató* that simply means “searching” or “research”). These profiles can clearly be interpreted in the previous context; they form part of the efforts of Communist state security both to map the methods and contacts of VKF-2, and also to learn more about the Hungarian exile community, many of whose members remained active, presumably as contacts or even members of western intelligence networks. Additionally, it must also have been of considerable interest to gather information on foreign diplomats or military officers who had previously served in Hungary and may still have had living contacts of any kind in the country, though already on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Files marked with a “κ” normally contained material on individuals about whom data was collected for an operational purpose (e.g., for future recruitment).⁶ The author of the original texts contained in this κ-file has been given the cryptic alias “Viktor Marczel” (sometimes written simply as “Marcel”), which cannot be clearly associated with Andorka’s person, life, or character. Only from the date of his death indicated at the end of the file (March 30, 1961), and from the sentences (consistently written in the first-person singular) concerning the activities of Andorka as a military leader and later as a diplomat (Hungarian Minister to Madrid) can it be established beyond any doubt that the notes were indeed prepared by the General.⁷

The material, entirely in typewritten form, was prepared in the summer and autumn of 1954, that is, in the months after the temporary release of General Andorka, who had been interned in 1950 and held captive for long years without a proper court trial. The descriptions follow one after the other, with no official markings on the pages such as a file number, a type of classification, or a numerical heading that might help the readers to identify the documents more precisely. At the end of each completed section (with one or two exceptions), the date and alias (“Marczel”) are written in pen, as if authenticated by the author.⁸ It is important to point out here that although there is a distinctive signature of the alias (code/cover name) in ink, we still cannot speak of fully authentic texts, but rather of “proof-

6 = = Éva Sz. Kovács, “Néhány gondolat az egykori magyar állambiztonság működéséről (elvek, eszközök, akciók),” *Levéltári Szemle* 61, no. 1 (2011): 5n10, 10n37.

7 = = ÁBTL - I. - 3.2.4. - K-1493. According to the top-secret report, dated July 29, 1963 under the alias “Viktor Marczel” (without any other kind of numeric indication) of the Subdivision 1-A. of the Internal Ministry’s (BM) II/I Group Executive (Csoportfőnökség) – In Andorka’s case, there was also an M-File, i.e. a working dossier, and B-File, i.e. a so-called recruitment dossier. These can no longer be found, so their content and the number of documents they contained is now in doubt. The M-File has been completely rearranged and the B-File has apparently been destroyed, as the material it contained had no ‘operational value’.

8 = = ÁBTL I. 3.2.4. K-1493. For example, see fol. 67.

read” versions, presumably finalised on the basis of Andorka’s previously prepared manuscript notes or even only upon his oral communications. Neither can it be ignored that state security officers themselves may have contributed significantly to the actual drafting of the typed texts. To understand the content and value of this source, we should know more about Andorka’s earlier life, political role, and convictions.

= = The Career and Worldview of Andorka

Andorka was born in Sopron in 1891 to an originally German-speaking family. His birth name was Fleischhacker; he took the name Andorka only in 1927 (after his maternal grandmother). His grandfather was a Lutheran pastor and a well-known preacher of his church. Andorka’s family and the General himself remained strongly connected to their Lutheran roots and were proud of their ancestors’ Protestant faith.⁹ Rudolf entered the Honvéd Secondary School in Sopron at the age of 14 and later studied in Budapest at the famous Ludovika Military Academy. After the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, he was sent almost immediately to the front, where he was seriously wounded. He subsequently completed general staff training during the war, and after the collapse of Austria-Hungary, he also served in the army of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. As a soldier he saw this as practically the only way to fight with any hope of success for the territorial integrity of Hungary. After the fall of the Soviet Republic, and despite his earlier role in the Hungarian Red Army, his career as an officer did not end even in Regent Horthy’s counter-revolutionary Hungary. He was able to return to the Hungarian General Staff within a short time (after a brief and temporary service away from the capital). Thanks to his excellent language skills (he spoke perfect German, French and English), he took on military diplomatic duties after 1920. He participated in the negotiations over the exchange of prisoners of war with the Soviet military leadership in Riga, then worked at the legation in Prague and later, from 1931, in Warsaw.¹⁰

In August 1937, Andorka became director of the Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Department in the Ministry of Defence.¹¹ He had established very good relations with the British diplomats and attachés accredited in Budapest. As early as then, he had developed a very negative attitude towards Nazi Germany. He therefore generally kept his distance from the staff of the German legation, al-

9 = = András Joó, “Andorka Rudolf,” in *Evangelische Pfarrer im KZ Mauthausen*, ed. Michael Bünkler and Dietlind Pichler (Wien: Evangelischer Presseverband, 2022), 139.

10 = = Sándor Szakály, *A 2. vkf. osztály: Tanulmányok a magyar katonai hírszerzés és kémelhárítás történetéből 1918–1945* (Budapest: Magyar Napló – VERITAS Történetkutató Intézet, 2015), 68–69; VERITAS OHA, “Interview with Rudolf Andorka,” 1–4.

11 = = See the works cited in the previous two notes for more details.

though it is worth noting that he nevertheless sympathised with Admiral Wilhelm Canaris.¹² The German admiral went down in history as a silent supporter of the resistance groups within the higher military circles of the Third Reich and also as one of the last victims brutally murdered by the Nazi regime after having been quickly sentenced to death by an SS court martial in April 1945. Canaris headed Germany's military counterintelligence organisation, the Abwehr, and he often visited Budapest. German military intelligence led by Admiral Canaris and the Hungarian VKF-2 worked together in the Balkans as part of a joint plan under the supervision of the Abwehr's Vienna branch (in the German terminology named "Ast"), mainly against the Soviets.¹³

Both according to his staff and according to his successor as head of VKF-2, the renowned István Ujszászy (who was later, in 1945, deported by the Soviets and died in captivity), Andorka's "situation assessments were precise" and his decisions "unchangeable" – both general hallmarks of a good military commander.¹⁴ From May 1939, after retirement and becoming Major General, he worked as a diplomat for two years. He represented Hungary as Minister Plenipotentiary in Madrid on the very eve of World War Two. Thus was fulfilled, albeit for only a relatively short time, his lifelong dream of a diplomatic career. The Hungarian Prime Minister at the time, Pál Teleki, was trying to distance himself from Nazi Germany and remain neutral in the impending war. He therefore commissioned Andorka to establish friendly relations with representatives of the Anglo-Saxon powers and of France. The General, in his new role as head of a diplomatic mission, was quite successful in his endeavours; he established a considerably good relationship with the British ambassador and soon also with Marshal Philippe Pétain, who was working as the French ambassador in Madrid at the time. Andorka sometimes passed on confidential messages from the Hungarian Prime Minister to Pétain.¹⁵ Hungary, however, continued to maintain close bonds with Hitler's Germany. Andorka strongly disapproved of this fact, as he remained consistently antagonistic to the Nazis and opposed dictatorial regimes in general. His views were

12 == Kádár, *A Ludovikától Sopronkőhidáig*, 570–71; VERITAS OHA, "Interview with Rudolf Andorka," 7, 15.

13 == András Joó, "Fedőneve: Jázmin. Adalékok Hatz Ottó tevékenységének megítéléséhez," in *Historia est lux Veritatis: Szakály Sándor köszöntése 60. születésnapján*, ed. László Anka, Gábor Hollósi, Eszter Zsófia Tóth, and Gábor Ujváry (Budapest: VERITAS Történetkutató Intézet – Magyar Napló, 2016) vol. 2, 357, 362–63; ÁBTL I. - 3.2.1. - Bt-262/2, Interrogation minutes of Endre Bartha, former military attaché to Bucharest, November 19, 1951.

14 == Haraszi, ed. *Vallomások a holtak házából*, 454–55.

15 == András Joó, "'Talán még emlékszik rám...': Andorka Rudolf tábornok 1954-ben írt jellemzése brit diplomatákról," in *VERITAS Évkönyv 2017*, ed. Gábor Ujváry (Budapest: VERITAS Történetkutató Intézet–Magyar Napló, 2018), 338, 341–42.

echoed in a highly emotional entry in his diary from the summer of 1939, in which he wrote the following after a short trip to France: “Happy, rich France! These are not totalitarian states where smiles are frozen.”¹⁶

== = The End of the General's Diplomatic Service and his Fate towards the End of World War Two

As both general and a soldier, Andorka was firmly convinced that Nazi Germany would lose the Second World War. His attitude did not remain hidden for long.¹⁷ In his position, he tried to keep his distance from the leaders of the Franco regime. In the spring of 1941, following an anti-German military coup in Belgrade, Hungary was pressured (primarily by its geopolitical position) to participate in the German military intervention against Yugoslavia. Prime Minister Teleki plunged into a crisis of conscience and took his own life. Andorka soon resigned as Hungarian minister to Madrid and returned to Hungary shortly afterwards; he did not want to pursue a policy with which he fundamentally disagreed. As an outgoing diplomat, once back in Budapest he was again received by Regent Miklós Horthy at a private audience. Andorka warned the head of state on this occasion not to take any further role in the war on the German side. Andorka did this because earlier, while still in Spain, he had yet to make a farewell visit to see the British ambassador there. Sir Samuel Hoare (who was not only a leading diplomat and ambassador, but a prominent and successful former intelligence officer and one-time Foreign Secretary), clearly warned him, as Andorka remembered, that Hungary should “at all costs” maintain at least its “formal” neutrality. Horthy did not take this advice seriously, even though Andorka communicated him a silent, semi-official warning (presumably coming from none other than the British Prime Minister).

In late June 1941, practically days after Andorka's audience, Hungary entered the war against the Soviet Union. During the same year (in early December), because of this earlier move and the presence of Hungarian troops on Soviet soil, His Majesty's Government in London declared that a state of war existed between Great Britain and Hungary. This was soon followed by Budapest's declaration of war on the US, not answered officially before June 5, 1942, then through a formal declaration of war by the US Congress, which was only reluctantly initiated by the Roosevelt administration.¹⁸

At this point, Andorka had retired from active service and no longer held any military or public office. From 1942 onwards, he established ever-closer relations

16 == Rudolf Andorka, *A madridi követségtől Mauthausenig* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1978), 145.

17 == MNL OL K 64 1941-41-17/res. pol., Letter from Rudolf Andorka on the chances of victory for the Axis Powers, January 8, 1941.

18 == Joó, “Andorka Rudolf tábornok 1954-ben írt jellemzése,” 342.

with Hungarian anti-war politicians and tried to help those who were persecuted for political reasons. As a former head of the Hungarian secret services, he still held prestige and was willing to use his influence for causes he believed in. It was during this time that he drew closer to the Hungarian Social Democrats.¹⁹ The famous British wartime intelligence organisation SOE (Special Operations Executive), founded at the wish of Winston Churchill in 1940, counted him as a trustworthy friend of the Anglo-Saxon allies in Hungary and tried to establish contacts with him through secret channels. Andorka's activities in Madrid and his friendship with the British ambassador to Spain (Hoare) and to the embassy's military attaché were not forgotten. The British war documents mention Andorka very positively. However, the German secret services did not forget him, either. Nor did the Hungarian supporters of National Socialism fail to draw the attention of the Germans (who were about to act against Hungary as a reluctant and untrustworthy ally) to him. After March 19, 1944 and the beginning of the German occupation of Hungary, Andorka was among the first to be arrested by the Gestapo and taken to the Mauthausen concentration camp, where he was imprisoned along with many other prominent Hungarians.²⁰

= = From Mauthausen to the Kistarcsa Internment Camp

In 1944, his family was able to discover that Andorka had been taken to the Mauthausen camp. After receiving this minimal information on his whereabouts, the family did not hear from him again until after the liberation of the concentration camp in early May 1945. He returned to Budapest sick and broken, after having been imprisoned again by the Soviets in Wiener Neustadt for some time. He suspected that he would not be very safe in Hungary, as the country remained under Soviet occupation. For this reason above all, after 1945 he became determined not to assume any office or political role. He later refused to cooperate with the Communist secret services, who were very much interested in his expertise and earlier connections. It is more than likely that they even encouraged him to emigrate and work abroad as their agent (which he rejected categorically). He was finally arrested in 1950 as part of a combined show trial of social democrats and military officers.²¹

As a prisoner, a combination of ill-treatment and torturous interrogations in the prison of the notorious State Defence Authority (ÁVO, АВН) shattered his already fragile health. Upon his arrest, his diaries (originally in four separate book-

19 = = VERITAS OHA, "Interview with Rudolf Andorka," 34; ÁBTL - I. - 2.1. - III/1 (V-143387), Protocol of the interrogation of Árpád Szakasits, April 2, 1956 (Top secret report of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Interior). Compare: ÁBTL I. 2.1. III/1 V-143387, Protocol of the interrogation of Rudolf Andorka, April 7, 1956.

20 = = Joó, "Andorka Rudolf tábornok 1954-ben írt jellemzése," 339; VERITAS OHA, "Interview with Rudolf Andorka," 15.

21 = = VERITAS OHA, "Interview with Rudolf Andorka," 14.

lets) were immediately confiscated; two of these turned up rather mysteriously in the 1950s among the files of the Hungarian National Archives. The fact alone that the diaries were published many years afterwards (in 1978) could raise several questions, as could the fact that, as we are told in the introductory study to them, the surviving booklets had happened to be placed among the Foreign Ministry papers “by mistake” from the document stock of the Internal Ministry. The diaries of Andorka are nevertheless an important source as they provide very interesting insights into the life of the Hungarian political and military élite before 1945. It is unfortunate that some of the most interesting entries (in the two unfound booklets) are probably lost forever.²²

General István Ujszászy is mentioned several times in various entries of General Andorka’s diary, often in conjunction with thought-provoking content.²³ In 1954 nothing was known about the fate of Ujszászy, who was almost certainly dead by then. Years earlier, the leaders of state security had made General Ujszászy write similar profiles of certain important persons (soldiers and diplomats) and other contacts, when in 1948 he was briefly detained in Hungary again (only to be handed over to the Soviet authorities at the end of that year). There are several parallels in the careers of the two prominent military leaders, and their relationship remained regular and close during the war years and following Andorka’s return from Madrid. Their meetings were informal and friendly, but primarily of a professional nature. For Ujszászy, first as head of VKF-2 and then, from 1942, as the head of the newly created State Defence Centre, these routine occasions formed part of his office’s information-gathering work. Although their views and characters were very different, Ujszászy respected his predecessor and mostly took him at his word.²⁴ Additionally, they largely relied on the same network of agents and similar methods, although Ujszászy had to face several new challenges, resulting from the war, that ultimately led to his fate in Soviet captivity.

= = = The Indictment and Trial of 1953

The bill of indictment against General Andorka and three other former VKF-2 officers, in which they were charged with war crimes, was completed on October 9, 1953 by the Budapest Prosecutor’s Office. It is not at all clear from the bill of indict-

22 == VERITAS OHA, “Interview with Rudolf Andorka,” 9, 15–18. See the diary mentioned above: Andorka, *A madridi követségtől* (especially page 59, where the editor tells us about the fate of the source).

23 == Andorka, *A madridi követségtől*, 199, 212, 223, 235, 259.

24 == Zoltán András Kovács, “A Janus-arcú tábornok. Adalékok Ujszászy István vezérőrnagy pályaképehez,” in *Vallomások a holtak házából. Ujszászy István vezérőrnagy, a 2. vkf. osztály és az Államvédelmi Központ vezetőjének az ÁVH fogóságában írott feljegyzései*, ed. György Haraszti (Budapest: Corvina – Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történelmi Levéltára, 2007), 79, 91.

ment, even in part, which of their former duties as soldiers and under superior orders could have been classified as war crimes. The indictment in Andorka's case was even more absurd since his active service had already ceased before Hungary even entered the war.²⁵

The only substantive prosecutorial accusation against the General was that he had acted as the head of VKF-2 against members of the Tourist Association of Nature Lovers, which was a former front for the communist movement. Under the laws in force at the time, any communist organisation was considered illegal. The defendants were in one instance all collectively reproached that they had "assisted the Arrow Cross movement to seize power" – an event that only occurred in October 1944, when Andorka, for example, had already been detained in the Mauthausen concentration camp. Furthermore, the Arrow Cross takeover occurred with external assistance and after Regent Miklós Horthy had been forced to resign. The logic of the indictment, however, bridged this problem with a peculiar "skill," arguing that, by working to "suppress all left-wing movements," they were also "the main orchestrators" of the "Arrow Cross movement gaining strength in the country."²⁶

Among the court documents of Andorka and his co-defendants one can find the minutes of his earlier interrogation on September 29, 1952. Here it is recorded that in 1942 he had political conversations with the former prominent Social Democratic leader, Árpád Szakasits, who later served as President of the Republic between 1948 and August 1949, then as President of the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic, and who was also imprisoned at the time (and not released before March 1956). This relationship with Szakasits was then discussed in more detail at an interrogation on October 2, 1953, shortly before the final indictment bill was drawn up. The minutes of the interrogation mention at least five meetings with the Social Democratic politician during the war. This interrogation protocol from the autumn of 1953 records that Andorka had intervened on behalf of Szakasits, who had been arrested in 1943, and talked to Ujszászy, his successor and the head of the State Defence Centre. This intervention led to the almost immediate release of Szakasits. In 1949, after General Andorka's pension had been withdrawn, Szakasits granted him an occasional subsidy of a thousand forints, which was substantial at the time.²⁷

25 == Budapest Főváros Levéltára [Budapest City Archives], BFL XXV. 4. – 0537/53., No. 1953.ü.0537/1, Indictment against I. Rudolf Andorka, II. Lajos Keresztes (Karleosa), III. Viktor Sigetter and IV. Valér Stefán for war crimes, October 9, 1953.

26 == BFL XXV. 4. - 0537/53., No. 1953.ü.0537/1, Indictment against I. Rudolf Andorka, II. Lajos Keresztes (Karleosa), III. Viktor Sigetter and IV. Valér Stefán for war crime, October 9, 1953.

27 == BFL XXV. 4. - 0537/53., No. 1953.ü.0537/1, Minutes of the interrogation of Andorka as a suspect (State Defence Authority, ÁVH), September 29, 1952 and October 2, 1953.

Andorka's arrest happened on the same day (April 24, 1950) as that of Szakasits, although the retired high-ranking officer was taken into custody from his own home, while Szakasits had the questionable "honour" of being arrested in the villa of none other than Mátyás Rákosi himself, the all-powerful General Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party. In June 1956, at his retrial, Szakasits was acquitted of all previous charges, although during the new investigation that preceded it, both he and Andorka were again questioned about their wartime relationship.²⁸

The first trial of Andorka and associates, with only one hearing, took place on October 23, 1953 in Kistarcsa (i.e., inside the internment camp), which was closed to the public. The presiding judge was Béla Jónás, one of the most notorious judges of the show trials of the era. The verdict was pronounced hastily, namely on the very same day (!). In fact, the imposed sentences were based on legislation from the 1950s, which continued to codify the law of the people's courts. While the prosecutor maintained the indictment and its logically absurd elements, the County Court of Budapest did not consider the offence of war crimes to be well-founded, and the defendants were instead convicted of so-called "anti-popular acts" (based on Soviet-style legal formulations).²⁹

In the "Authorised Compilation of the Substantive Criminal Laws in Force" (with its common Hungarian abbreviation, "BHÖ"), compiled in 1952, Chapter IV of the first part of the so-called Special Provisions, under the heading "Offences against the People's Republic," included war crimes in five separate points, and crimes against the people in nine points.³⁰ These were compiled based on earlier laws and, in this case, on Section 15 of ME Decree (the two capital letters standing for *miniszterelnöki*, that is, "Prime Ministerial") No. 81/1945 concerning peoples' court decisions, which, in fact, became an annex to Act VII of 1945. Within this annex, thus identical with the mentioned ME Decree and applied also in the case of the three VKF-2 officers who were sentenced together with Andorka, Section 15, Point 3 states: "A public official with authority who has consistently exercised an anti-popular, pro-fascist official function is guilty of crimes against the people."

28 == ÁBTL I. 2.1. III/1 V-143387, Minutes of the interrogation of Árpád Szakasits, April 2, 1956 (Top secret report of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Interior). Compare: ÁBTL I. 2.1. III/1 V-143387, Minutes of the interrogation of Rudolf Andorka, April 7, 1956.

29 == BFL XXV. 4. - 0537/53., No. B.III.0537/1953-4, Verdict of the Budapest County Court (in Kistarcsa), October 23, 1953.

30 == László Nánási, "A magyarországi népbírászkodás joganyaga 1945–1950," in *Pártatlan igazságszolgáltatás vagy megtorlás: Népbíróság-történeti konferencián (2011. május 23. Kecskemét) elhangzott előadások szerkesztett változatai*, ed. József Gyenesei (Kecskemét: Bács-Kiskun Megyei Önkormányzat Levéltára, 2011), 42.

30 == Here I express my special thanks to Izabella Drócsa, my young colleague, who helped me clarify the legal background. See her relevant article: Drócsa, "A szovjet büntetőjog-tudománynak a magyar büntetőjogra gyakorolt hatása 1945 után – különös tekintettel az anyagi és eljárási jogban megjelenő alapelvekre és az en-

Despite the alleged thaw and reformist relaxation following Stalin's death, the verdict as illustrated here was passed without sufficient foundation, practically on the model of the previous show trials, and indeed rather hastily. The shortly submitted petition for clemency, however, was dealt with far less quickly and proceeded with considerable delay during the same period in which Andorka and his reports were being written. Prior to the request for clemency in June 1954, the Ministry of Justice was asked for Andorka's case file, together with the opinion of the presiding judge (Jónás), who, however, dismissed it at the time, because no such request had yet been filed.³² In September 1954, after the General's daughter (Nadin) had indicated that the remaining months of imprisonment to be served would shortly have to be resumed, she had not yet received any response to the pardon application. Meanwhile, although he had been provisionally set free, her convicted father's health had deteriorated badly. It was not until the beginning of 1955 that the clemency request was answered, and by its resolution of March 2, 1955, the Presidential Council finally granted a pardon for the remaining period.³³

=== The Second World War and the Intelligence Landscape of the Early Cold War: Andorka Recalls Characters from the Past

The quality of the texts in the Marczel dossier varies in both content and the degree of elaboration. General Andorka recorded his impressions, for example, of certain British diplomats and legation attachés at considerable length, just as he could recall his time as head of VKF-2 (or as minister to Madrid). All this must have happened in accordance with prior instructions received from state security.³⁴ There are several descriptions of both Hungarian and foreign individuals, but contradictory elements are often mixed in between factual details. There are three more elaborate and substantial personal profiles of prominent British diplomats, of which the one

nek nyomán elfogadott jogszabályokra," *Pro Publico Bono – Magyar Közigazgatás* 3 (2017): 160–63. See also: 1945. évi VII. törvény a népbíráskodás tárgyában kibocsátott kormányrendeletek törvényerőre emeléséről, I. számú melléklet az 1945. évi VII. törvényhez: 81/1945. (II. 5.) ME rendelet a népbíráskodásról, Különös rész 15§ 3. pont.

32 == BFL XXV. 4. - 0537/53, No. 5783/5/1954. I.M. I/2, Ernő Fiedler to the President of the Budapest Metropolitan Court (Fővárosi Bíróság Elnöke), November 1, 1954; BFL XXV. 4. - 0537/53., No. 5783/5/1954. I.M. I/2, Béla Jónás to the Ministry of Justice, November 5, 1954.

33 == BFL XXV. 4. - 0537/53, No. 5783/5/1954. I.M. I/2, Letter of Nadin Andorka to the Ministry of Justice, without number or date; The Ministry of Justice to the President of the Budapest Metropolitan Court on the resolution of the Presidential Council, March 11, 1955.

34 == ÁBTL I. 3.2.4. K-1493. The "Marczel" research dossier, Profiles of British diplomats, July 4, 1954. 27–32, marked by handwritten numbers.

on Ambassador Samuel Hoare is especially noteworthy since he had a background in intelligence. As a diplomat in Spain, Hoare had built up a secret network and even after the war remained influential as a veteran politician, becoming a member of the House of Lords. Sir Maurice Drummond Peterson, the second among the three British diplomats described by Andorka, was appointed Ambassador to Ankara at the end of the Second World War. In 1946 he succeeded the much more well-known Archibald Clark Kerr as head of the British Embassy in Moscow. Upon his untimely resignation, Peterson gave up his diplomatic career and was succeeded by Sir Alvary Douglas Frederick Gascoigne, whom Andorka knew well and who served in Budapest for years, both before and after the Second World War. All three personalities are potentially interesting from an intelligence point of view, although Peterson was already deceased and Gascoigne was not an active diplomat at the time in question, having already been recalled from Moscow in 1953.³⁵

Concerning Hoare, Andorka remarked:

During the First World War, Hoare was the head of a British mission working in Russia, which was an expository unit of the British Intelligence Service. In 1918, he worked on a similar assignment in Italy. After the war he published a book³⁶ on this work, but (for understandable reasons) it is rather colourless and boring reading.

This shows that the General followed events and book appearances abroad. He continued:

In the most desperate period of the world war, when hardly anyone dared to believe that the Germans and Italians could lose the war, it was thanks to Hoare's personal qualities that the influence of the fascist powers at their height was counterbalanced at the Francoists', and Spain maintained its neutrality in this tantalising situation. Hoare is now, I believe, a member of the English House of Lords as Lord Templewood. He is certainly a strong Conservative, though I do not think he would be a strong personal supporter of Churchill or Eden, who ousted him from the chair of Foreign Secretary at the time.

35 == For Gascoigne's role in Hungary see: Éva Haraszti-Taylor, 'Dear Joe.' *Sir Alvary Frederick Gascoigne, G. B. E. (1893–1970): A British Diplomat in Hungary after the Second World War. A Collection of Documents from the British Foreign Office* (Nottingham: Astra Press, 2005) and Gyula Hegedüs, "Magyar–angol kapcsolatok, 1944–1956" (PhD Dissertation, Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Humanities, Doctoral School of History, 2011)

36 == His work on his own operations in Russia: Samuel Hoare, *The Fourth Seal: The End of a Russian Chapter* (London: Heinemann, 1930).

The last two sentences at the end of the profile are curious and thought-provoking: “The question is, could this high authority politician be of any use to Hungarian aspirations? Perhaps he still remembers me, who always behaved fairly and appropriately towards him.”³⁷

As far as Sir Maurice Peterson was concerned (who was also one of Britain’s ambassadors in Francoist Spain), in 1924-1925 Andorka served in the same place of duty as him: the capital of Czechoslovakia, Prague. Peterson was British legation secretary there. As Andorka wrote, at that time there was only a “superficial” acquaintance between them. Then, in 1939, on arriving in Spain, he found Peterson serving as the British ambassador in that country. Of their relationship there, he wrote in 1954:

I became somewhat closer to him because of our old acquaintance in Prague, but this contact was rather expressed in the forms of courtesy. Peterson was able to enhance even more the taciturnity common in English life to the point where a grunted yes or no was hardly to be heard from him. This was not an expression of mistrust, but an individual trait. The ministers of the other neutral small countries looked at me in amazement that I sometimes managed to get him to speak. But even then, he said nothing of any significance.³⁸

Andorka could not understand how this diplomat, lacking all flexibility, could be put in such important positions and at such fateful times. He drew his brief conclusion as follows: “I do not know what he could do today, after his mission in Moscow, but I do not think he is worth the slightest attention from the point of view of Hungarian interests.”

Hoare seemed even more interesting, as he had been a member of MI5 (Secret Service) and MI6 (SIS, Secret Intelligence Service) and later belonged to the inner circle of Neville Chamberlain, known as the representative of the policy of appeasement towards Hitler in the late 1930s. When intelligence mattered in Spain, it was intelligence gathering done by the MI6, and Hoare (in full accordance with the Foreign Office) widely used the information received through the agents and contacts of this organisation to face diplomatic challenges with promising results. None other than Kim Philby, one of the SIS operatives in Iberia during the war, was involved in this intelligence work. By this time, Philby, whose role was far from understood by the British in the middle of the 1950s, had already been operating as one of the most successful spies for the Soviets. It was only more than a decade later that he was finally exposed as a Soviet spy and forced to flee to the Soviet

37 == ÁBTL I. 3.2.4. K-1493, Andorka’s profile on Hoare, pages marked 27–28.

38 == ÁBTL I. 3.2.4. K-1493, Andorka’s profile on Peterson, page marked 29.

Union.³⁹ Hoare's role could only be considered as secondary by the middle of the 1950s. However, his earlier role and any information on him could still represent some value, and it can hardly be regarded as accidental that Andorka was asked to share information specifically on him. Similarly, British diplomats whose experiences were closely related to both Hungary and Moscow were not ignored, if not for the sake of the lessons which intelligence history could provide for the secret services. Although under suspicion, Philby had not yet been exposed as a Soviet spy, nor could his further useful activity be completely ruled out, since by 1951 he had gained prestige from his earlier work. He could hope for a distinguished career in the secret service, with the highest positions open to him after successful work even in Washington.⁴⁰

Philby's person and connections may have played a fairly important role in Eastern European conspiracy charges and the resulting show trials. He was closely implicated in connection with Noel Haviland Field, who was imprisoned in Hungary until October 1954. This connection was referred to in one of the recollections of Vladimir Farkas, who played an important role in both the Rajk trial and in organising and directing the intelligence and reconnaissance work of the State Defence Authority (ÁVH) abroad until 1955.⁴¹ While it would not be prudent for us to overestimate this connection, it could still have seemed useful to explore Philby's earlier contacts (and thus important contacts in Spain) and personal acquaintances even as late as 1954 (possibly through anyone who could recall the by no means insignificant past events). All three British diplomats could be linked to Spain and secret operations there during the Second World War (in August 1939, Gascoigne was sent to Tangier and appointed Consul-General for the Tangier Zone and the Spanish Zone of the Protectorate of Morocco).⁴² All three of them were sent to Moscow later. Philby was also in Spain from 1937 to the summer of 1939 as an MI6 agent. He remained in charge of covert operations in the Iberian Peninsula from 1941 to 1944, until, in an ironic twist of fate, he was appointed head of the newly created SIS department responsible for combating the Soviet Union and the communist threat.

Andorka's respect for Canaris was mentioned earlier. The Chief of the Abwehr also visited Spain more than once during the war years; on one occasion, in

39 == David Messenger, "Against the grain: Special Operations Executive in Spain, 1941–1945," in *The Politics and Strategy of Clandestine War: Special Operations Executive, 1940–1946*, ed. Neville Wylie (London: Routledge, 2007), 179.

40 == Barton Whaley, *Soviet Clandestine Communication Nets: Notes for a History of the Structures of the Intelligence Services of the USSR* (Cambridge, MA: Communication and Security Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969), 172.

41 == Vladimir Farkas, "Antimemoárok V," *Kapu 3* (1991): 19.

42 == See this information on Gascoigne: Éva Haraszti-Taylor, "Egy brit diplomata Magyarországon a második világháború után," in *R. Várkonyi Ágnes Emlékkönyv*, ed. Péter Tusor (Budapest: ELTE BTK, 1998), 595.

the summer of 1939, he even met Andorka for a discussion in Madrid. He made no secret of aggressive German plans and an impending war about to break out.⁴³ In his series of short reports in the summer of 1954, Andorka (on June 10) also wrote more about Canaris and his own links with the German Abwehr.⁴⁴ Information about former German intelligence officers may have been of interest again, even in the 1950s, because some of the former intelligence officers remained active after 1945. They were involved in the build-up of the Federal Intelligence Service (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*) of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as in the earlier reconnaissance operations or important intelligence missions on behalf of the US under the leadership of former Abwehr officer, Reinhard Gehlen.⁴⁵ This organisation continued to employ Richard Kauder (alias Klatt),⁴⁶ for example, who was active for a long time after the war and who, before 1944 and in close cooperation with the Hungarian services, had carried out very successful reconnaissance operations against the Soviets from Sofia. (This spy centre in the Bulgarian capital was the so-called Klatt Bureau.) Soviet interrogators also questioned Colonel Gyula Kádár extensively about Kauder.⁴⁷ The people of the former Canaris network, so far as they had not either fallen victim of the purges after the failed assassination attempt against Hitler, or been taken into Soviet captivity (where they mostly disappeared forever), must have been of interest until at least the mid-1960s.

In the same document, dated June 10, 1954, he also briefly discusses his contacts with some US representatives in Hungary, especially diplomats. Among the few paragraphs that recall only insignificant moments, the following may have caught the attention of his state security readers:

I would like to draw attention to one person, and that is Francis Deák (Ferenc Deák). I had already heard during the war years that a man of Hungarian origin named Ferenc Deák played a major role in the American intelligence service in Switzerland, which was headed by Dulles (brother of the present Secretary of State).⁴⁸

43 == Andorka, *A madridi követségtől*, 151.

44 == ÁBTL I. – 3.2.4. – K-1493, Andorka's remarks on Abwehr officers, pages marked 38–39.

45 == Thomas Wolf, "Die Anfänge des BND. Gehlens Organisation – Prozess, Legende und Hypothek," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 64, no. 2 (2016): 191–225.

46 == Kauder, Richard Josef, KLATT (1900–1960), German spy, who later worked for US intelligence.

47 == CIA FOIA ERR. Agent Report: Kauder-Klatt, Richard Intelligence Activities, 13 February, 1953; Meyer, Winfried. *Klatt. Hitlers jüdischer Meisteragent gegen Stalin: Überlebenskunst in Holocaust und Geheimdienstkrieg*. Berlin: Metropol, 2015; ÁBTL I. 4.1. A-862, Gyula Kádár's reminiscences, 162–63.

48 == Allen Dulles, the first civilian Director of Central Intelligence (CIA). His brother was John Foster Dulles.

After the war, this Deák was formally assigned to the American Legation as a civil Air Attaché, and in this capacity, he regularly appeared in Budapest. Andorka hinted that Deák may also have tried to recruit agents into his network in Hungary.

Another profile of Deák was prepared by Andorka the following year, in February 1955. However, he could not add much to what he had already written, only what he had heard second-hand from the former driver of the American Minister to Budapest, who, like him, had been interned at the Kistarcsa internment camp. Deák had been sent to Lisbon during the war as a representative of the Office of Strategic Services (the wartime intelligence and sabotage organisation, better known simply as OSS). In addition to this, he represented a de facto separate line to Tibor Eckhardt, the prominent politician of the Horthy era, residing in Washington. In America, Eckhardt collaborated with the War Department's Special Intelligence Division, or more precisely the intelligence service under its direction, operating under the code name "POND". This special intelligence unit began operating in March 1943 with Roosevelt's approval. Its Hungarian network was code-named PONY (of which Deák became a member under the code name JUDSON), and one of its main European connections was established in Lisbon. Otto Habsburg (with whom the Hungarian Prime Minister, Miklós Kállay maintained contact through the Portuguese capital) also played a role in this activity. The organisation continued to operate during the Cold War, with Eckhardt maintaining his role in it.⁴⁹

== Conclusions and Epilogue

If we intend to draw some conclusion based on what is found in Andorka's file, what he describes in his profiles, and on what the Hungarian state security officials were presumably concerned with, the focus of interest was clearly on Anglo-Saxon networks, Hungarian exiles, and possible channels for contact leading from abroad to Hungary. In 1954 Hungarian state security was interested particularly in those individuals who had previous and surviving contacts with members of British or American intelligence organisations. The importance of Hungarian emigration, including former diplomats, high-ranking soldiers, and some prominent politicians, increased depending on whether they were seen as worthy of a role in Washington, either in the political or the intelligence field – or even in both (Tibor Eckhardt, for example). Between 1953 and 1956, the positions of the old conservative elite of the pre-1945 era became somewhat strengthened within the Hungarian exile community, and also (temporarily) in the Hungarian National Committee based in New York.⁵⁰ Former

49 == Mark Stout and Katalin Kádár Lynn, "Every Hungarian of any value to intelligence": Tibor Eckhardt, John Grombach, and the Pond," *Intelligence and National Security* 31, (2016): 703–5, 709–12. See also concerning Deák: István Vida and Károly Urbán, eds., "Magyar béketapogatózások az Egyesült Államokban. Dokumentumok a Lisszaboni Magyar Követség titkos levéltárából," *Kritika* 14, no. 3 (1985): 27.

50 == Katalin Kádár Lynn, "The Hungarian National Council / Hungarian National Committee 1947–1972," in *The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare. Cold War*

diplomat Baron György Bakách-Bessenyei,⁵¹ in addition to being an integral member of the POND, came to greater prominence as a member of the Hungarian National Committee and Chairman of the Committee for External Affairs. Interestingly, in 1952 it was considered essential in Budapest to open a separate research dossier on Bakách-Bessenyei. At that time, the VIII/4. Department, responsible for intelligence work in the Hungarian émigré communities, opened the research file.⁵²

Andorka also wrote a profile on former diplomat László Bartók, who became a member of the POND in 1948 (under the code name LADD). He had contacts with US intelligence before 1945, and as Hungarian minister to Vienna, according to POND records, maintained “very close contact” with the US minister and the chief of the CIA in the Austrian capital. After Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy had been forced into exile in early June 1947, Bartók only barely escaped from the Hungarian Legation in Vienna with some American help. In 1951 Bartók moved to Uruguay under the name DAHL, and from there ran operations in Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil against communists.⁵³

The scope of the present study does not allow us to give a proper glimpse of each individual profile in General Andorka’s dossier, let alone to discuss their contents in more detail. In truth, any of them could offer good material for a case study. Only a selection of hopefully very interesting correlations have been highlighted in this study to illustrate the value of the material that has survived for us, while the other relevant dossiers (Mt and Bt) have been lost.

As a sort of epilogue, it should be mentioned that in its session of December 17, 1956, the Supreme Court of the Hungarian People’s Republic annulled the part of the sentence against Rudolf Andorka and his associates (B. III. 0537/1953-4.) pertaining to his person alone. The decision was annulled on the grounds of lapse of time at the time of the court proceeding.⁵⁴ Thus, the complete fabrication of the original indictment of “war crimes” was still not recognized.

Organizations sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe / Free Europe Committee, edited by Katalin Kádár Lynn (Saint Helena, CA: Helena History Press, 2013), 238–45.

51 == Bakách-Bessenyei, György (1892–1959), Minister in Vichy from July 27, 1941 to September 10, 1943, then in Bern until after the German occupation of Hungary.

52 == ÁBTL I. 4.1. A-2127/17, Hungarian National Committee, Report of the Internal Ministry (BM) Department II/5, February 13, 1956, on the subject of the target person (Bakách-B.) identified under the alias “István Perényi”, for whom the State Defence Authority (ÁVH) Department VIII/4 opened a personal file in 1952.

53 == Stout, ‘Every Hungarian of any value’, 711; Lajos Gecsényi, “Iratok a magyar emigráció történetéhez: Bartók László bécsi követ és Szegedy-Maszák Aladár washingtoni követ levélváltása (1947–1948),” *Levéltári Közlemények* 85 (2014): 112.

54 == BFL XXV. 4. - 0537/53, No. B. törv. III.1689/2., Resolution of the Supreme Court of the People’s Republic of Hungary, December 17, 1956.

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Portrait of General Rudolf Andorka
in 1961.

Júlia Andorka's
private collection

Keywords

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*Secret intelligence, State security, Show trials, Diplomacy,
Second World War*